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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
accretion so formed does not belong to the riparian owners
would remove hundreds of acres from private use and owner-
ship to lie idle until the state should see fit to make some use
of them. The criterion announced by the court in the instant
case provides a fair, workable guide for future litigation on this
subject.15
Sidney D. Fazio
PROPERTY - THIRTY-YEAR PRESCRIPTION IN BOUNDARY ACTION
In accordance with an informal survey defendant's author in
title erected a fence in 1904 between his land and that now be-
longing to the plaintiff. Upon discovering that this fence en-
croached on his land, plaintiff brought suit under Article 823
which provides for judicial determination of boundaries in cer-
tain situations. Defendant contended that the fence line should
be recognized as the boundary under the provisions of Article
852 relative to thirty year boundary prescription.' After re-
versing the trial court on original hearing, the court of appeal
reversed itself on rehearing and affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that under Article 852 mutual consent was
necessary to establish a boundary. 2 The Supreme Court granted
writs and held, on rehearing, reversed for defendant. Uninter-
rupted possession of land for thirty years beyond title and up to
a visible separation is sufficient under Article 852 to establish a
boundary at the line of the visible separation. Mutual consent to
such a boundary is not necessary. Sessum v. Hemperley, 233 La.
444, 96 So.2d 832 (1957).
At French law 3 any possessor may have his ideal rural
bounds judicially determined at any time, provided there has
been no written agreement between the parties fixing a bound-
15. This case is also noted in 32 TUL. L. REV. 319 (1958).
1. "Whether the titles, exhibited by the parties, whose lands are to be limited,
consist of primitive concessions or other acts by which property may be trans-
ferred, if it be proved that the person whose title is of the latest date, or those
under whom he holds, have enjoyed, in good or bad faith, uninterrupted posses-
sion during thirty years, of any quantity of land beyond that mentioned in his
title, he will be permitted to retain it, and his neighbor, though he have a more
ancient title, will only have a right to the excess; for if one can not prescribe
against his own title, he can prescribe beyond his title or for more than it calls
for, provided it be by thirty years possession."
2. Sessum v. Hemperley, 83 So.2d 546 (La. App. 1955).
3. 1 ENCYCLOPtDiE DALLOZ, DROIT CIVIL, "Bornage" nos 4047 (1951) ; 2
CODE CIVIL ANNOTA art. 646, p. 81, n. 100 (1935). See also AUBRY ET RAU,
COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, "Dus homage," § 199 (6th ed. 1935) ; 3 PLANIOL
ET RIIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 43142 (2d ed. 1952).
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ary. Physical bounds are presumed correct and are not uncer-
tain, though they are open to attack. However, if the markers
are ancient or if there has been adverse possession in accord
with them for thirty years or more the action cannot be success-
fully brought. Mutual consent to the establishment of the
markers is not required. The action also may be successfully
maintained if bounds, once determined, are lost. At common
law4 the courts recognize a doctrine of adverse possession which
requires open, notorious, and continuous possession of specific
lands for a statutory period (usually twenty years), and a
hostile intent to possess as owner, with or without knowledge
of the encroachment. Some common law courts also accept the
doctrine of acquiescence, which requires mutual recognition of
bounds, and that the bounds be in doubt or dispute at the time
the statute of limitations begins to run.5
In Louisiana boundaries may be judicially determined in
three basic situations: where no bounds have ever been estab-
lished, where bounds once established have been lost, and where
bounds have been incorrectly established. In the first situation
the bounds must be determined in accordance with the written
titles6 and in the second they must be redetermined and placed
where they formerly stood.7 In neither of these situations will
prescription run so as to prevent the bringing of the boundary
action." Conceivably, incorrect bounds could be established in
any one of three ways. If fixed judicially, the decision will be-
come res judicata in one year, and may be attacked within that
period only for fraud.9 Boundaries may be established extra
judicially by mutual consent or' ° in accordance with a formal
4. For general discussion, see BROWN, BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRIN-
CIFLES 60 (1957).
5. See Comment, Real Property: Acquiescence in Lieu of Adverse Possession
in Boundary Line Gases, 8 OiuA. L. REv. 486 (1955), and cases cited therein.
6. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 823, 845 (1870).
7. Zeringue v. Harang, 17 La. 849 (1841).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 825 (1870). Accord: Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La.
617, 621, 99 So. 482, 483 (1924): "As long as there exist no physical bounds,
whether because none have ever been placed or because those once placed have
disappeared, the action to place or replace them cannot be prescribed against."
9. LA. CODE OF PRAATIC art. 613 (1870). Accord: Sessum v. Hemperley,
233 La. 444, 96 So.2d 832 (1957).
10. Article 832 requires that extra-judicial bounds be fixed by mutual consent
and Article 833 adds the requirement of a formal survey. But courts have modi-
fied these provisions, allowing a 'boundary to stand if either mutual consent or a
lo.mal survey can be shown. The prescription of ten years under Article 853 has
boen applied in both cases, though this latter article contemplates a formal survey.
See LeBlanc v. Barrios, 89 So.2d 447, 453 (La. App. 1956) (boundary never
"fixed or mutually agreed upon") ; Arabie v. Terrebonne, 69 So.2d 516 (La. App.
1953) (neither survey or consent shown) ; Picou v. Curole, 44 So.2d 354 (La.
19581
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survey. In either case, the action to correct bounds so estab-
lished will prescribe in ten years.1 The third possibility is the
extra judicial fixing of bounds by the erection and maintenance
of a visible separation by one party for thirty years. However, a
uniform line of courts of appeal decisions has refused to accept
this method as a basis for starting prescription in Louisiana
and has required consent by both parties or acts indicating ac-
quiescence to the separation by the party whose lands are en-
croached on before prescription would commence.' 2 As a direct
result of these decisions mutual consent became a requirement
to begin prescription under Article 852 as well as under Article
853, which deals with the rectification of an error in establish-
ing boundaries.
The instant case rejects mutual consent as a requirement to
begin boundary prescription of thirty years under Article 852.
Relying on the language of the Code the court outlines the two
requirements to begin this prescription: a visible separation and
uninterrupted possession for thirty years beyond the possessor's
title. 13 The courts appear willing to accept any reasonable
marker as a sufficient visible separation,1 4 having read that re-
quirement into Articles 852 and 853. Where there has been no
separation of the lands, the action in boundary will not pre-
scribe, although lands may be acquired by thirty-year prescrip-
App. 1950) (boundary must be fixed by survey or consent) ; Blanchard v. Mon-
rose, 12 La. App. 503, 125 So. 891 (La. App. 1930) (Article 853 not applicable
without survey or active acquiescence).
11. LA. CrvIL CODE art. 853 (1870).
12. See Williams v. Bernstein, 51 La. Ann. 115, 25 So. 411 (1899) (land held
in occupancy until adverse possession recognized by neighbor) ; LeBlanc v. Bar-
rios, 89 So.2d 447 (La. App. 1956) (illogical to believe crooked ditch was con-
sidered as boundary in spite of cultivation up to it) ; Beene v. Pardue, 79 So.2d
356 (La. App. 1955) (fence not evidence of adverse ownership without recogni-
tion as boundary) ; Arabie v. Terrebonne, 69 So.2d 516 (La. App. 1953) (consent
required under Articles 852 and 853) ; Simmons v. Miller, 170 So. 521 (La. App.
1936) (must show fence is an extra-judicial boundary by consent).
13. "First, there must be a visible boundary, artificial or otherwise; second,
there must be actual uninterrupted possession, either in person or through an-
cestors in title, for thirty years or more of the land extending beyond that de-
scribed in the title and embraced within the visible bounds." Sessum v. Hemperley,
233 La. 444, 476, 96 So.2d 832, 843 (1957).
14. See Blanc v. Duplessis, 13 La. 334 (1839) (oak tree plus acts of posses-
sion proven by parol sufficient) ; LeBlanc v. Barrios, 89 So.2d 447 (La. App.
1956) (cultivation to crooked ditch not sufficient for lack of consent) ; Vicknair
v. Langridge, 57 So.2d 714 (La. App. 1952) (remains of old fence sufficient,
possibly old post holes would be) ; Strickland v. Butler, 64 So.2d 22 (La. App.
1953) (cultivation to fences along lane sufficient) ; Harmon v. Dufilho, 139 So.
530 (La. App. 1932) (fence taken in by canal sufficient) ; New Orleans v. Joseph
Rathborne Land Co., 209 La. 93, 108, 24 So.2d 275, 280 (1945) (artificial
markers "consist of marked lines, stakes, roads, fences, buildings, and similar
matters marked or placed on the ground by the hand of man").
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tion acquirendi causa under Article 3499.15 Boundary prescrip-
tion and prescription acquirendi causa are similar. The tests
applied to determine what constitute acts of possession under
Articles 852 and 349916 should not differ materially except that
to prescribe against an action in boundary there must be a
visible separation between the two tracts of land. However,
there is a difference between the acts necessary to interrupt
prescription of the action in boundary and those necessary to
interrupt prescription acquirendi causa by acknowledgment. A
court of appeal case 7 indicated that informal acknowledgment
of an encroachment would not be sufficient to interrupt pre-
scription under Article 853 and place the possessor in the posi-
tion of a mere occupant. But verbal acknowledgment is suf-
ficient to interrupt prescription acquirendi causa under Article
3520.18
On rehearing the instant case the Supreme Court did not
find it necessary to consider the ten-year prescription estab-
lished by Article 853. However, this decision apparently would
not reject the prior jurisprudence which requires mutual con-
sent to start the prescriptive period in Article 853. It appears
that this shorter period could have been found applicable by
finding mutual consent to the fence as a boundary for any ten-
year period or mutual reliance on a formal survey for ten years.
Louisiana courts have consistently held that mutual consent is
not to be implied from passive failure to object to a visible
separation. 9 There must be an "active acquiescence with the
realization that they [are] actually consenting to a boundary
15. See Roscue v. Mitchell, 190 La. 758, 182 So. 740 (1938) (irregular fence
ignored but acts of possession good for thirty years prescription under Article
3499); Odenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482 (1924) (prescription of
Article 852 is not same as prescription acquirendi causa) ; Duplantis v. Locascio,
67 So.2d 125 (La. App. 1953) (prescription acquirendi causa applied to cultivated
land); Schilling's Heirs v. Kent Piling Co., 51 So.2d 329 (La. App. 1951) (ap-
plied prescription acquirendi causa requiring corporeal possession).
16. General article for principle of thirty-year acquisitive prescription. "The
ownership of immovables is prescribed for by thirty years without any need of
title or possession in good faith."
17. DeBakey v. Prater, 147 So. 734 (La. App. 1933).
18. See Blades v. Zinsel, 15 La. App. 104, 130 So. 139 (1930) (offer to buy
was acknowledgment and prescription under Article 3500 was interrupted there-
by) ; A. M. Edwards Co. v. Dunnington, 58 So.2d 225 (La. App. 1952) (verbal
acknowledgment sufficient under Article 3520 to interrupt prescription).
19. See Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482 (1924) ; Owens v. T.
Miller & Sons Building Supply Co., 101 So.2d 773 (La. App. 1958) (plea of ten-
year prescription under Article 853 based on visible bounds fixed by mutual ac-
quiescence overruled); Picou v. Curole, 44 So.2d 354 (La. App. 1950) (adverse
possession no indication of consent); Kobler v. Koch, 6 So.2d 55 (La. App.
1941).
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and acquiescing in the location thereof. '20 When the requisite
consent is not present, the possessor is considered to hold as an
occupant and not by adverse possession as is required by Article
853.21 In this situation it will be necessary to establish thirty
years possession as a prerequisite to prescription under Article
852.
Allen B. Pierson, Jr.
PROPERTY - TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLE COMMUNITY PROPERTY -
ESTOPPEL AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Plaintiff brought suit to be declared owner of land which his
wife had purchased during marriage and sold to a third party
without his written consent. There was no recital in the act of
sale that the property was purchased by the wife in her name as
her separate property, and the district court, applying the pre-
sumption that such property was part of the community of
acquets and gains, annulled the purported sale because it lacked
the husband's signature. The court of appeal held, reversed.
Since the husband was instrumental in arranging the sale by
the wife, was actually present at its execution and received a
part of the consideration, he ratified the act of sale and could
not sue to rescind it because his signature was absent. The
vendee was not acquiring property by estoppel since the wife
here had a deed in her name. Cato v. Bynum, 98 So.2d 257 (La.
App. 1957).
The opinion in the instant case lends itself to two distinct
interpretations. On first reading it would appear that the hus-
band's signature is being supplied by parol testimony, under a
plea of estoppel, to pass title to community property of which
the wife is record owner. On the other hand, the court's lan-
guage may easily be taken to mean that the husband, by his
conduct at the time of the sale, is estopped to assert the char-
acter of the property in question as community, thus making a
sale by the wife alone translative of title, since a sale of the
separate property of the wife does not require the signature of
the husband. The first of these interpretations involves a con-
sideration of the parol evidence rule.
It is the generally accepted principle in Louisiana that title
20. Blanchard v. Monrose, 12 La. App. 503, 506, 125 So. 891, 893 (1930).
21. Williams v. Bernstein, 51 La. Ann. 115, 25 So. 411 (1899).
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